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Abstract
When utilities are additive, we uncovered in our previous paper [1] many similarities
but also surprising differences in the behavior of the familiar Competitive rule (with
equal incomes), when we divide (private) goods or bads.The rule picks in both cases the
critical points of the product of utilities (or disutilities) on the efficiency frontier, but
there is only one such point if we share goods, while there can be exponentially many
in the case of bads.
We extend this analysis to the fair division of mixed items: each item can be viewed
by some participants as a good and by others as a bad, with corresponding positive
or negative marginal utilities. We find that the division of mixed items boils down,
normatively as well as computationally, to a variant of an all goods problem, or of an
all bads problem: in particular the task of dividing the non disposable items must be
either good news for everyone, or bad news for everyone.
If at least one feasible utility profile is positive, the Competitive rule picks the
unique maximum of the product of (positive) utilities. If no feasible utility profile is
positive, this rule picks all critical points of the product of disutilities on the efficient
frontier.
1 Introduction
In our previous paper [1] we consider fair division of (private, divisible) items under linear
preferences, represented for convenience by additive utilities. We explain there the appeal
of this domain restriction for the practical implementation of division rules vindicated by
theoretical analysis. We focus there on the Competitive Rule (aka Competitive Equilib-
rium with Equal Incomes) to divide the items, and contrast its behavior when we divide
goods (assets, such as family heirlooms, real estate, land, stocks), and when we divide bads
(chores, workloads, liabilities, noxious substances or facilities). Several normative properties
of this rule are identical in both contexts, e. g., No Envy and a simple version of Maskin
Monotonicity that we call Independence of Lost Bids. However the unexpected finding is
that several aspects of the rule are very different in the two contexts: dividing bads is not a
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mirror image of dividing goods. The Competitive Rule picks a unique welfare profile when it
divides goods, but for dividing bads it often proposes many (up to exponentially many in the
number of agents and bads) allocations with different welfare consequences; in the former
case the competitive welfare profile is continuous in the marginal rates of substitution, in
the latter case such continuity is not feasible. Also the rule makes every participant benefit
from an increase in the goods to divide, a monotonicity property that is out of reach when
we divide bads.
Here we generalize this analysis to fair division problems involving (non disposable)
mixed items, i. e., both goods and bads, or even items about which participants disagree
whether they are good or bad. An inheritance may include good and bad real estate (e. g.,
heavily mortgaged or not), divorcing couples must allocate jewellery as well as obnoxious
pets, workers sharing a multiple jobs relish certain jobs and loath others; and managers
facing the division of onerous tasks may deliberately add some desirable items to “sweeten”
the deal of the workers.
For a start we show that, upon adapting the standard definition to allow for the co-
existence of positive and negative prices and for individual budgets of arbitrary sign, the
Competitive Rule is always non empty, and its basic normative properties (No Envy, Inde-
pendence of Lost Bids, Core from Equal Split1) are preserved.2
The status quo ante situation with nothing to divide delivers in our model zero utility
to each participant. If all items are good, any feasible allocation brings (weakly) positive
utilities, so that the arrival of the “manna” is good news for everyone; similarly the task of
dividing non disposable, undesirable items is a chore for everyone bringing weakly negative
utilities to all. With mixed items, some good, some bad, allocations where some participants
enjoy positive utility and others negative utility are of course feasible, and some interpreta-
tions of fairness pick such divisions (see an example below). Remarkably the Competitive
Rule never does: in any problem mixing goods and bads, either it weakly improves the
welfare of all agents above the status quo ex ante, or it weakly decrease everyone’s welfare
below this benchmark. The rule enforces a strong solidarity among agents: the task of di-
viding any bundle of non disposable items is either unanimously good news or unanimously
bad news.
The result We call a problem positive if the zero utility profile is strictly below the efficient
utility frontier; negative if it is strictly above; and null if it is on this frontier. In a positive
problem the Competitive Rule (CR for short) picks the unique allocation maximizing the
Nash product of utilities among positive profiles: it behaves as if there are only goods,
selects a unique utility profile, and enjoys the same regularity and monotonicity properties
as in the all-goods case (within the class of positive problems). In a negative problem the CR
picks all the critical points of the product of disutilities over the efficient negative profiles:
it behaves as if there are only bads, in particular it may pick many different utility profiles,
and loses its regularity and monotonicity properties. In a null problem the rule implements
the null utility profile.
Note that the familiar Fair Share utility still sets a lower bound on each agent competitive
utility, but these utilities are no longer a useful benchmark as they can be of different signs
in the same problem (see an example below).
1Although in a slightly weaker sense, see Lemma 1.
2Note that existence follows (much) earlier results about competitive equilibrium under satiated (not nec-
essarily linear) preferences such as [2]. Our proof in our special domain is however simpler and constructive.
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Some simple examples Here is a two-agent, two-item example where a is a good and b
is a bad:
a b
u1 4 −2
u2 1 −5
There is one unit of each item to share. So a is very good for agent 1 compared to b, while
b is very bad relative to a for agent 2.3 Fair Share utilities obtain by giving one half unit of
each item to each agent: UFS1 = 1, U
FS
2 = −2. The familiar Egalitarian Rule equalizes the
utility gains above this benchmark relative to the maximal feasible gain:
UER1 − UFS1
UMAX1 − UFS1
=
UER2 − UFS2
UMAX2 − UFS2
where UMAX1 = 4, U
MAX
2 = 1
Combined with Efficiency this gives UER1 = 2
2
7 , U
ER
2 = − 57 : see Figure 1. Thus the division
task is good news for agent 1 but not for agent 2. By contrast the Competitive Rule focuses
on the interval of strictly positive and efficient utility profiles corresponding to the allocations
a b
z1 x 1
z2 1− x 0
where
1
2
≤ x ≤ 1
It picks the midpoint x = 34 with corresponding utilities U
CR
1 = 1, U
CR
2 =
1
4 , where agent 1
gets only her Fair Share utility.
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Figure 1: Competitive (circle) and Egalitarian (square) utility profiles for the first example.
Our next example is a negative problem
a b
u1 4 −5
u2 1 −5
3Recall interpersonal comparisons of utilities are ruled out, only the underlying preferences matter.
3
where the efficient allocations with strictly negative utility profiles cover the interval
a b
z1 0 x
z2 1 1− x
where
4
5
≤ x ≤ 1
so the competitive allocation is at x = 910 with utilities U
CR
1 = U
CR
2 = − 12 , where again
agent 1 gets only her Fair Share utility. The ER utilities are UER1 =
2
5 , U
ER
2 = − 75 .
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Figure 2: Competitive (circle) and Egalitarian (square) utility profiles for the second exam-
ple.
In Section 5 we compute the competitive division in a sequence of problems with two
agents, two bads, and a third item starting as a good and becoming increasingly bad. The
initial problem is positive, then becomes negative; the number of competitive allocations
takes all values from 1 to 4.
We stress another key difference between the Competitive and Egalitarian Rules, implied
by Independence of Lost Bids. If an object a is a good for some agents and a bad for others,
efficiency implies that only the former agents eat it. The CR ignores the detailed disutilities
of the latter agents: nothing changes if we set those disutilities to zero, so that a becomes
a good. This means that we need only to consider problems where items are either (at
least weakly) good for everyone, or (at least weakly) bad for everyone. Obviously this
simplification does not apply to the ER.
2 The model
The set of agents is N with cardinality n, that of objects is A. A problem is P = (N,A, u ∈
RN×A) where the utility matrix u has no null column.
With the notation zM =
∑
i∈M zi, and e
B for the vector in RB with eBb = 1 for allb, we
define a feasible allocation as z ∈ RN×A+ such that zN = eA. Let F(P) be the set of feasible
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allocations, and Φ(P) the corresponding set of utility profiles. We always omit P if it is
clear from the context.
We call a feasible utility profile efficient if it is not Pareto dominated4; also a feasible
allocation is efficient if it implements an efficient utility profile.
The following two partitions, of N and A respectively, are critical:
N+ = {i|∃a : uia > 0}, N− = {i|∀a : uia ≤ 0}
A+ = {a|∃i : uia > 0}, A− = {a|∀i : uia < 0}, A0 = {a|max
i
uia = 0}
When no confusion may arise, we call an object in A+ good, one in A− bad, and one in A0
neutral.
Definition 1: For any problem P a competitive division is a triple (z ∈ F , p ∈ RA, β ∈
{−1, 0,+1}) where z is the competitive allocation, p is the price and β the budget. The
allocation zi maximizes i’s utility in the budget set B(p, β) = {yi ∈ RA+|p · yi ≤ β}:
zi ∈ di(p, β) = arg max
B(p,β)
{ui · yi} (1)
Moreover zi minimizes i’s wealth in her demand set
zi ∈ arg min
di(p,β)
{p · yi} (2)
The Competitive Rule selects at each problem P the set CR(P) of all competitive allocations.
In addition to the usual demand property (1), we insist that an agent spends as little
as possible for her competitive allocation. This requirement appears already in [2]: in its
absence some satiated agents in N− may inefficiently eat some objects useless to themselves
but useful to others. For instance in the two agents-two item problem u =
6 2
0 −1 the
inefficient allocation z =
1/3 1
2/3 0
meets (1) for the prices p = ( 32 ,
1
2 ) and budget β = 1.
However z2 = (0, 0) guarantees the same (zero) utility to agent 2 and costs zero, so it fails
(2). The only competitive division according to the Definition is z =
1 1
0 0
for p = ( 12 ,
1
2 ).
Check that in a competitive division we have
pa > 0 for a ∈ A+ ; pb < 0 for b ∈ A− ; pa = 0 for a ∈ A0 (3)
If the first statement fails an agent who likes a would demand an infinite amount; if the
second fails no one would demand b. If the third fails with pa > 0 the only agents who
demand a have uia = 0, so that eating some a violates (2); if it fails with pa < 0 an agent
such that uia = 0 gets an arbitrarily cheap demand by asking large amounts of a, so (2) fails
again.
Here is another consequence of (2), the importance of which is illustrated by the above
example:
∀a ∈ A+ : zia > 0 =⇒ uia > 0 (4)
4That is U ∈ Φ(P), and if U ≤ U ′ and U ′ ∈ Φ(P), then U ′ = U .
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Indeed if i eats some a ∈ A+ and uia = 0, she gets a cheaper competitive demand by ignoring
a; and if uia < 0 her allocation is not competitive (recall pa > 0).
We recall three standard normative properties of an allocation z ∈ F(P). It is Non
Envious iff ui ·zi ≥ ui ·zj for all i, j; it guarantees the Fair Share utilities iff ui ·zi ≥ ui ·( 1neA)
for all i. It is in the Weak Core from Equal Split if for all S ⊆ N and all y ∈ RS×A+ such
that yS =
|S|
n e
A there is at least one i ∈ S such that ui · zi ≥ ui · yi. When we divide goods
competitive allocations meet these three properties, even in the much larger Arrow-Debreu
preference domain.
Lemma 1 A competitive allocation is efficient; it meets No Envy, guarantees the Fair Share
utilities, and is in the Weak Core from Equal Split.
Proof.
Efficiency. The classic argument by contradiction can be adapted here. Let z be a compet-
itive allocation Pareto inferior to the feasible allocation y. Some agent i∗ strictly prefers yi∗
to zi∗ which implies p · zi∗ < p · yi∗ by (1). So if we show p · zi ≤ p · yi for all i, we contradict
zN = yN by summing up these inequalities. Note that we can assume that y itself is efficient
which will be useful below.
First we have p · zi = β for i ∈ N+, or i could buy more of an object in A+ he likes;
moreover i prefers strictly zi to any yi such that p · yi < β, and weakly if p · yi ≤ β. So
p · zi ≤ p · yi for all i ∈ N+. It remains to show p · zj ≤ p · yj for all j ∈ N−.
We distinguish two cases. If β = 0,+1 we have uj · zj = 0 (the best feasible utility for j)
and uj · yj = 0 as well. At z agent j can only consume objects in A0: by (4) j eats no item
in A+ and eating in A− strictly lowers her utility; agent j eats no object in A+ at y either
by efficiency of y, and by uj · yj = 0 she eats nothing in A− as well. Objects in A0 are free
((3)) so p · zj = p · yj = 0.
Now if β = −1 an agent j in N− must eat some objects in A− that he dislikes hence his
competitive demand zj has p · zj = β and as above he strictly prefers zj to yj if p · yj < β:
so p · zj ≤ p · yj as desired.
Other properties. No Envy is clear and it implies Fair Share by additivity of utilities. We use
again the standard argument to check the Weak Core property. Assume coalition S ⊂ N has
an objection y to the competitive division (z, p, β) where everybody in S strictly benefits.
So y ∈ RS×A+ and ui · zi < ui · yi for all i ∈ S. If β = 0,+1, this inequality is impossible for
i ∈ N− because ui · zi = 0 (see above), so S ⊆ N+. Then we sum over S the inequalities
p · zi < p · yi to get
|S|β = p · zS < p · yS = p · |S|
n
eA
which contradicts p · eA = p · zN ≤ nβ.
If β = −1 we have p · zi = β for all i, which simplifies the argument.
Remark 1: For positive problems a competitive allocation may fail the standard Core
from Equal Split property, where coalition S blocks allocation z if it can use its endowment
|S|
n e
A to make everyone in S weakly better off and at least one agent strictly more. This
is because “equal split” gives resources to the agents in N− that they have no use for. Say
three agents share one unit of item a with u1 = u2 = 1, u3 = −1. Here CR splits a between
agents 1 and 2, which coalition {1, 3} blocks by giving 23 of a to agent 1.
Remark 2: It is easy to check that CR meets Independence of Lost Bids, the translation
of Maskin Monotonicity under linear preferences: see the precise definition in [1]. Just as
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in Proposition 2 of that paper, CR is characterized by, essentially, combining this property
with Efficiency.
3 The result
The key to classify our problems when N and A are given is the relative position of the set
of feasible utility profiles Φ and the cone Γ(N) = RN++ × {0}N− , which can only be of three
types. Write the relative interior of Γ as Γ∗(N) = RN+++ × {0}N− .
Definition 2 We call the problem P = (N,A, u)
positive if Φ(P) ∩ Γ∗(N) 6= ∅;
negative if Φ(P) ∩ Γ(N) = ∅;
null if Φ(P) ∩ Γ(N) = {0}.
We fix P and check that these three cases are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. This
amounts to show that Φ∩Γ∗ = ∅ and Φ∩ ∂Γ 6= ∅ together imply Φ∩Γ = {0}. Pick U non
zero in Φ∩ ∂Γ and derive a contradiction. Let Ui > 0 for the agents in P ⊂ N+ and Uj = 0
for those in Q = N+P . If some i ∈ Q eats some a he likes (uia > 0), he must also eat
some b he dislikes (uib < 0): then let someone in P take a small amount of b from i and we
get a new U ′ ∈ Φ ∩ ∂Γ where P ′ is larger than P . If no j in Q eats any a she likes (so she
does not eat any she dislikes either), we pick any i ∈ Q and an item a she likes; a must be
eaten at U exclusively by some agents in P ∪N−; if some j ∈ P eats a we let j give a small
amount of a to i and we have found U ′ ∈ Φ ∩ ∂Γ with a larger P ′; if some k in N− eats
some a we have uka = 0 so again k can give his share of a to i and P increases. Repeating
this construction until P = N+ we reach U ∈ Φ ∩ Γ∗, the desired contradiction.
Given a smooth function f and a closed convex C we say that x ∈ C is a critical point
of f in C if the supporting hyperplane of the upper contour of f at x supports C as well:
∀y ∈ C : ∂f(x) · y ≤ ∂f(x) · x or ∀y ∈ C : ∂f(x) · y ≥ ∂f(x) · x
This holds in particular if x maximizes or minimizes f in C.
In the statement we write Φeff for the set of efficient utility profiles, and RN= for the
interior of RN− .
Theorem Fix a problem P = (N,A, u).
i) The problem P has a competitive division with a positive budget if and only if it is positive.
In this case an allocation is competitive iff it maximizes the product ΠN+Ui over Φ ∩ Γ∗;
thus the corresponding utility profile is unique, positive in N+ and zero in N−.
ii) The problem P has a competitive division with a negative budget if and only if it is
negative. In this case an allocation is competitive iff it is a critical point of the product
ΠN |Ui| in Φ that belongs to Φeff∩RN= . All utilities are negative in any competitive allocation.
iii) The problem P has a competitive allocation with a zero budget if and only if it is null.
In this case an allocation is competitive iff its utility profile is zero.
Note that the Theorem implies in particular that CR(P) is non empty for all P.
4 Proof
First we give a closed form description of the competitive demands per Definition 1, i. e.,
the solutions of (1) plus (2).
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Lemma 2 Fix P a budget β ∈ {−1, 0,+1} and a price p such that pa > 0 in A+, pb < 0
in A−, and pa = 0 in A0.
i) if i ∈ N− and β = 0,+1, the allocation zi ∈ RA+ is competitive iff ui ·zi = 0 (for instance
zi = 0)
ii) if i ∈ N− and β = −1, zi ∈ RA+ is competitive iff p · zi = −1, zia = 0 on A+, zia > 0
on A0 only if uia = 0, and
{b ∈ A− and zib > 0} =⇒ |uib||pb| ≤
|uib′ |
|pb′ | for all b
′ ∈ A− (5)
iii) if i ∈ N+ the problem (1) has a bounded solution iff
uia
pa
≤ |uib||pb| for all i ∈ N+, a ∈ A+, b ∈ A− (6)
Then the allocation zi is competitive iff p · zi = β, and zi meets (5) and the two following
properties:
{a ∈ A+ and zia > 0} =⇒ uia
pa
≥ uia′
pa′
for all a′ ∈ A+ (7)
{a ∈ A+, b ∈ A−, and zia > 0, zib > 0} =⇒ uia
pa
=
|uib|
|pb| (8)
Statement i) is clear upon noticing that eating some object in A0 is free so that (2)
holds. For ii) observe that to meet the budget constraint i must be buying some b ∈ A−; if
i buys some a ∈ A+ she can increase her utility by buying less of b and of a; and (2) still
holds because objects in A0 are free. Property (5) simply says that she buys objects in A−
with the smallest disutility per unit of (fiat) money.
For statement iii) pick agent i in N+ and note that a budget balanced purchase of both
objects a ∈ A+ and b ∈ A− increases strictly i’s utility iff uiapa >
|uib|
|pb| , in which case (1) has
no bounded solution. As already noted in the proof of Lemma 1, i can buy some object he
likes in A+ with any slack budget, therefore p · zi = β, which implies (2). Properties (5)
follow as for agents in N− and (7) is similar. Finally if i eats both a ∈ A+ and b ∈ A−,
inequality uiapa <
|uib|
|pb| implies that a budget neutral reduction of zia and zib increases Ui:
thus we need (8) as well. 
Proof of the Theorem
Step 1 : Statement i). Let P = (N,A, u) be a positive problem. We show that the maximiza-
tion of the Nash product on Φ ∩ Γ finds a Competitive allocation with a positive budget.
As Φ ∩ Γ is compact and convex, there is a unique U∗ maximizing in Φ ∩ Γ the product
ΠN+Ui; clearly U
∗
i > 0 for all i ∈ N+. Let z∗ be an allocation implementing U∗. By
efficiency the items in A0 are only eaten by agents in N+ and/or N−, who do not care about
them (uia = 0); this implies
∀i ∈ N+ : uiA0 · z∗iA0 = 0 (9)
(with the notation uiB · ziB =
∑
B uibzib).
By efficiency the items in A+ are eaten in full by N+ (property (4)); ditto for the items
in A− because for such items and any i ∈ N−, we have uia < 0 and U∗i = 0. We define
prices as follows:
∀a ∈ A+ : pa = max
N+
uia
U∗i
> 0; ∀b ∈ A− : pb = −min
N+
|uib|
U∗i
< 0 (10)
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and pa = 0 on A0.
Pick any a ∈ A+ and i ∈ N+ eating a (such i exists by the argument above): then uia > 0
by efficiency, so the FOC of the maximization program implies ∂∂zja ln(uj ·z∗j ) ≤ ∂∂zia ln(ui·z∗i )
⇐⇒ uiaU∗i ≥
uja
U∗j
for all j ∈ N+. This is property (7). Checking (5) is similar: assume i ∈ N+
eats b ∈ A− and recall uib < 0, so the FOCs give |uib|U∗i ≤
|ujb|
U∗j
for all j ∈ N+. Now we fix
i ∈ N+ and apply (7), (5):
{a ∈ A+ and z∗ia > 0} =⇒ U∗i =
uia
pa
; {b ∈ A− and z∗ib > 0} =⇒ U∗i =
|uib|
|pb| (11)
Summing up numerator and denominator over the support of z∗i (the items he eats) and
invoking (9) as well as pa = 0 on A0, we get
U∗i =
∑
A+
uiaz
∗
ia −
∑
A− |uib|z∗ib∑
A paz
∗
ia
=
ui · z∗i
p · z∗i
=⇒ p · z∗i = 1
as required by Lemma 2.
If A− is non empty, there is at least one agent i ∈ N+ eating a ∈ A+ and b ∈ A−. For
any such i property (11) gives uiapa = U
∗
i =
|uib|
|pb| , which proves (8), and
for all a′ ∈ A+, b′ ∈ A− : uia
′
pa′
≤ U∗i ≤
|uib′ |
|pb′ |
implying (6).
Step 2: Statement i). Suppose the problem P = (N,A, u) has a competitive division
(z, p,+1). We show that P is positive and z maximizes the Nash product as in Step 1.
Because zi = 0 is in the budget set, all agents in N− must get zero utility. If they
consume anything, it must be an object in A0 by assumption (4). Each i in N+ can buy
some amount of any object, so at z her utility is positive: Ui = ui · zi > 0. Therefore P is
positive.
Fix i ∈ N+ and recall objects in A0, if any, have zero price (assumption (3)). Thus if i
eats some a ∈ A0 we have uia = 0, otherwise i benefits by simply stop eating a. This gives
uiA0 · ziA0 = 0 (as in (9)), and pA0 · ziA0 = 0 as well.
We also know that p is positive on A+ and negative on A−, and that p · zi = 1 for all
i ∈ N+ (by efficiency of z). Write the sets of objects i eats in A+ ∪ A−as A+(i) ∪ A−(i):
A+(i) is non empty because Ui > 0 (A−(i) can be empty). By Lemma 2 uiapa is constant on
A+(i), and equal to
|uib|
|pb| on A−(i) if the latter is non empty. Thus this common ratio is also
uiA+(i) · ziA+(i) + uiA−(i) · ziA−(i)
pA+(i) · ziA+(i) + pA−(i) · ziA−(i)
=
Ui
p · zi = Ui (12)
(where the first equality uses uiA0 · ziA0 = pA0 · ziA0 = 0). Therefore
uia
Ui
= pa for all a ∈ A+(i); |uib|
Ui
= |pb|for all b ∈ A−(i)
Then (7) implies uiapa ≤ Ui for all a ∈ A+ while (6) implies Ui ≤
|uib|
|pb| for all b ∈ A−. These
two facts together give for all i ∈ N+:
uia
Ui
≤ pa for all a ∈ A+ and |uib|
Ui
≥ |pb| for all b ∈ A− (13)
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From this we derive that U maximizes ΠN+Ui in Φ∩Γ, or equivalently that it is critical for
the product of utilities in Φ∩Γ: the restriction to N+ of any feasible utility profile is below
the hyperplane supporting ΠN+Ui at (the restriction of ) U :
for all U ′ ∈ Φ :
∑
i∈N+
U ′i
Ui
≤ n
Pick z′ ∈ F implementing U ′ and use (13) to compute (recalling that p is zero on A0)∑
i∈N+
ui · z′i
Ui
=
∑
a∈A
∑
i∈N+
uiaz
′
ia
Ui
≤
∑
a∈A+
∑
i∈N+
paz
′
ia −
∑
a∈A−
∑
i∈N+
|pb|z′ib =
∑
a∈A
pa = n
Step 3: Statement ii). Let P = (N,A, u) be a negative problem. We show there exists a
critical point U∗ of the product ΠN |Ui| in Φ that belongs to Φeff ∩ RN= . The profile U∗ we
construct maximizes this product on Φeff ∩ RN− , and any allocation z∗ implementing it is
competitive.
Substep 3.1: If U∗ ∈ Φeff∩RN= is a critical point of ΠN |Ui| in Φ, then any z∗ implementing
U∗ is competitive.
We pick an allocation z∗ implementing U∗ and mimick the argument in Step 1 above.
While objects in A+ are still eaten exclusively by N+, those in A− are eaten by anyone (and
everyone eats at least one object in A−). If a ∈ A+ and z∗ia > 0 for i ∈ N+, a transfer of
some a from i to j ∈ N+ leaves the allocation on the same side of H as Φ, i. e., below: this
implies uia|U∗i | ≥
uja
|U∗j | ; if z
∗
ib > 0 for b ∈ A− (and i ∈ N), we consider similarly a transfer of
some b from i to j to get |uib||U∗i | ≤
|ujb|
|U∗j | . Then we define p in A+∪A− as in (10), upon replacing
U∗ by |U∗| and minimizing over all N instead of just N+ when defining p in A−. The analog
of (11) follows, with the same changes, and the same computation yields p · z∗i = −1, this
time for all i.
Setting pa = 0 on A0, we now use Lemma 2 to check as in Step 1 that z
∗
i is i’s competitive
for p and β = −1.
Substep 3.2: We show that the profile U∗ maximizing ΠN |Ui| in Φeff ∩ RN− is a critical
point of this product in Φ (and is in RN= ).
We have ui · eA < 0 for every i ∈ N , else the allocation zi = eA yields utilities in Γ.
Consider the set F of utility profiles dominated by Φ: F = {U ∈ RN− |∃U ′ ∈ Φ : U ′ ≤ U}.
This set is closed and convex, and contains all points in RN− that are sufficiently far from
the origin: any U ∈ RN− such that UN ≤ mini ui · eA is dominated by the utility profile of
z : zi =
|Ui|
|UN |e
A, i ∈ N .
Fix τ ≥ 0 and consider the upper contour of the Nash product at τ : K(τ) = {U ∈
RN− |ΠN |Ui| ≥ τ}. For sufficiently large τ the closed convex set K(τ) is contained in F . Let
τ0 be the minimal τ with this property. Negativity of P implies that F is bounded away from
0 so that τ0 is strictly positive. By definition of τ0 the set K(τ0) touches the boundary of F
at some U∗ with strictly negative coordinates. Let H be a hyperplane supporting F at U∗.
By the construction, this hyperplane also supports K(τ0), therefore U
∗ is a critical point of
the Nash product on F : that is, U∗ maximizes
∑
i∈N
Ui
|U∗i | over all U ∈ F . So U
∗ belongs
to Pareto frontier of F , which is clearly contained in the Pareto frontier of Φ Thus U∗ is a
critical point of the Nash product on Φ and belongs to Φeff ∩RN= . Any U in the interior of
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K(τ0) is clearly dominated by some U
′ in K(τ0) ⊂ F , hence by some U ′′ ∈ Φ ∩ RN− : so U∗
maximizes the Nash product on Φeff ∩RN− .
Remark 3: Note that the supporting hyperplane H to Φ at U∗ is unique because it is
also a supporting hyperplane to K(τ0) that is unique. This means that U
∗ belongs to a face
of a polytope Φ of maximal dimension.
Step 4: Statement ii). Suppose the problem P = (N,A, u) has a competitive division
(z, p,−1). We show that P is negative and the corresponding utility profile U is a criti-
cal point of the product ΠN |Ui| in Φ that belongs to Φeff ∩ RN= .
The utility of any agent in N− at z is negative: goods in A0 are free ((3)), he does not
eat any object in A+ ((4)), and his budget is negative. Applying Lemma 2 to an agent in
N+ we see, as in Step 2, that the ratio
uia
pa
is constant on A+(i), and equal to
|uib|
|pb| on A−(i)
The same computation (12) gives uiapa =
|uib|
|pb| =
Ui
p·zi = −Ui, so Ui < 0 in N+ as well. By
Lemma 1 the negative profile U is efficient, so Φ cannot intersect   and P is negative.
We derive now the criticality of U for ΠN |Ui| much like we did in Step 2. The difference
is that now everyone eats some object in A−, and i in N+ may or may not eat some object
in A+ (but i in N− still doesn’t).
From |Ui| = uiapa on A+(i), =
|uib|
|pb| on A−(i) we get (2) (for all i, and with |Ui| instead of
Ui). Because any i ∈ N must eat some b∗ in A−, properties (5) and (2) yield |Ui| = |uib∗ ||pb∗ | ≤
|uib|
|pb| for all b ∈ A−. Then (6) gives uiapa ≤ |Ui| for all a ∈ A+, and this implies the analog of
property (13): for all i ∈ N
uia
|Ui| ≤ pa for all a ∈ A+ and
|uib|
|Ui| ≥ |pb| for all b ∈ A− (14)
The criticality of U ∈ Φeff ∩ RN= for ΠN |Ui| in Φ means now that all feasible utility
profiles are below the hyperplane supporting ΠN |Ui| at U
for all U ′ ∈ Φ :
∑
i∈N
U ′i
|Ui| ≤ −n
(but this time U does not maximize ΠN |Ui| on all of Φ). The derivation of this inequality
from (14) proceeds exactly as in Step 2.
Step 5: Statement iii). Let P = (N,A, u) be a null problem. We show there exists a price
p such that (z, p, 0) is competitive iff ui · zi = 0 for all i.
As Φ ∩ Γ = {0} we can separate the projection of Φ on RN+ from RN++ : there exists
λ ∈ RN++ {0} such that
∑
i∈N+ λiUi ≤ 0 for all U ∈ Φ. If λi = 0 for some i ∈ N+ we pick
j ∈ N+ such that λj > 0 and the allocation where j eats an object she likes and i eats all
the rest yields a contradiction. Thus λ is strictly positive.
Pick any z∗ ∈ F implementing U = 0: it is efficient therefore uiA0 · z∗iA0 = 0. We have
z∗ ∈ arg max{
∑
N+
λi(ui · zi)|z ∈ F} =
= arg max {
∑
a∈A+
(
∑
N+
λiuiazia)−
∑
b∈A−
(
∑
N+
λi|uib|zib)|z ∈ F}
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We define the price p as
∀a ∈ A+ : pa = max
N+
λiuia; ∀b ∈ A− : pb = −min
N+
λi|uib|
and as usual p = 0 in A0. Clearly p is positive on A+and negative on A−. On the support
of z∗i we have
∀a ∈ A+ ∪A− : z∗ia > 0 =⇒ pa = λiuia (15)
implying p · z∗i = λi(ui · z∗i ) = 0. The definition of p implies pa ≥ λiuia and |pb| ≤ λi|uib|
for all i ∈ N+, a ∈ A+, b ∈ A−. This implies (6) at once; together with (15) it gives (7); the
proof of (5) and (8) is similar.
Step 6: Statement iii). Suppose the problem P = (N,A, u) has a competitive division
(z, p, 0). We show that P is null.
Let U be the utility profile of z. Clearly Ui = 0 for i ∈ N−. Fix i ∈ N+ such that zi 6= 0:
because p ·zi = 0 (Lemma 2) i must eat at least one object in A+ and one in A−. By Lemma
2 again we have uiapa =
|uib|
|pb| for all a ∈ A+(i), b ∈ A−(i). Writing 1λi for this common ratio,
we have
ui · zi = 1
λi
(p · zi) = 0
and we conclude U = 0. As U ∈ Φeff the intersection Φ ∩ Γ contains nothing more.
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Appendix: a monotonic sequence of examples
We have N = {1, 2}, A = {a, b, c} and
a b c
u1 −1 −3 λ
u2 −2 −1 λ
and λ takes all integer values from 4 to −3. The first two problems, for λ = 4, 3 are positive;
for λ = 2 the problem is null, then negative from λ = 1 to −3.
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